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Abstract 
This study investigates corporate reactions to the deregulation of stock repurchases set forth on 1 
October 2001, in Japan, by looking at the motivations for stock repurchases. We found that stock 
repurchases increased significantly after the ban on treasury stocks was lifted. Our results show 
that firms with free-cash flow problems initiated a repurchase plan to distribute excess cash to 
shareholders and reduce agency costs over the sample period. In addition, firms who wanted to 
signal undervaluation also undertook stock repurchases over the sample period. These firms were 
affected by the deregulation, unlike firms that repurchase to reduce agency costs. We determined 
that firms with weak incentives to signal undervaluation increased stock repurchases significantly 
in order to respond to the deregulation, since these firms had the ability to take advantage of 
treasury stock purchases. 
 




Stock repurchases have received significant attention in financial literature because 
they have become an increasingly important financial behaviour  that has been 
implemented in a large number of countries. Much of the research focuses on 
open-market repurchase programs adopted by U.S. firms. Those previous research has 
successfully discussed this financial behavior  and documented the potential 
motivations for stock repurchases, including the signalling of undervaluation, 
takeover defence, dividend substitution, stock options and capital structure adjustment 
(Kaplan and Reishus,  1990;  Fenn and Liang, 1997; Bagwell and Shoven, 1988; 
Dittmar, 2000). However, research on stock repurchases in Japan is much more 
scarce. 
Unlike in the United States, stock repurchases were nearly non-existent in Japan 
until the Japanese Commercial Code was revised in October 1994. The revision 
allowed Japanese corporations to acquire their own shares, but only for the purpose of 
retiring stocks or for employees’ stock plans. The 1997 revision of the Code lifted the 
prohibition on repurchasing, but only for the purpose of granting stock options. 
Finally, on 1 October 2001, the Japanese government amended the Commercial Code; 
this amendment completely abolished the restrictions on stock repurchases and lifted 
the ban on treasury stocks. Since then, Japanese companies have been able to 
repurchase their stocks, regardless of the amount and the purpose of the acquisition. 
Long-term holding of treasury stocks also became possible; this was not possible 
under the formerly strict requirement for their immediate redemption or disposition. 2 
 
Corporate managers could now initiate a repurchase plan and hold treasury stocks for 
specific purposes. 
As a result, stock repurchase announcements in Japan have grown dramatically 
since the end of 2001 (see Figure 1). Table 1 illustrates the change in open-market 
stock repurchases in Japan. Panel A details announced repurchases by frequency, 
value and number. The mean and the median of repurchases per announcement in the 
two periods—before and after 1 October 2001—are shown in Panels  B and C, 
respectively. Panel A shows that stock repurchase announcements in the second period 
occurred at the rate of 52 per month, or almost two times the rate of repurchases in the 
first period (before 1 October 1 2001). The value of open-market repurchase 
announcements by Japanese firms listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange increased by 
448%,  from JPY 75 billion to JPY 411 billion, and the number of repurchase 
announcements increased 198%, from 86 million to 256 million monthly. 
By looking closely at the value of stock repurchases, we found that, after the 
deregulation of stock repurchases on 1 October 2001, the mean of repurchases per 
announcement increased, while the median of repurchases per announcement 
decreased. This suggests that firms with high stock prices tended to initiate a 
repurchase plan. The number of stock repurchases per announcement decreased after 
1 October 2001, regardless of the mean and the median of repurchases. We found that 
firms used stock repurchases more flexibly after the Japanese government lifted the 
ban on treasury stocks. Corporate managers have more discretion and tend to 
undertake smaller stock repurchases, and to buy more frequently. 
 
 





Table 1: Stock repurchases in the two periods 
Panel A 
    frequency/month  value/month  number/month 
Before 1 October 2001  28    75,000,000  86   
After 1 October 2001  52    411,000,000  256   
Panel B    average   
    value/frequency  number/frequency   
Before 1 October 2001  3,490,000,000  3,967   
After 1 October 2001  4,660,000,000  2,903   
Panel C    median   
    value/frequency  number/frequency   
Before 1 October 2001  392,000,000  654   
After 1 October 2001  293,000,000  293   
 
In  this  study, we investigate corporate reactions to the deregulation of stock 
repurchases.  Using a sample of 2161  Japanese firms listed on the Tokyo Stock 
Exchange, we can assess the increasing importance of stock repurchases to Japanese 
companies, study the usage of treasury stocks and discover what kind of firms tend to 
increase stock repurchases in response to the lifting of the ban on treasury stocks.   
To summarize our main findings, we found that Japanese firms initiated a 
repurchase program to signal undervaluation or to distribute excess cash over the 
sample period. The deregulation of stock repurchases motivated Japanese firms to 
acquire their own shares and to take advantage of treasury stocks. By controlling the 
motivations for repurchasing, our results show that the deregulation did not prompt 
firms with free cash flow problems to increase repurchase programs, since these firms 
can hold treasury stocks until later reissue and agency problems still exist unless firms 
cancel them. We also found that firms that are motivated to signal undervaluation 
increased stock repurchases to respond to the deregulation, since these firms have 
managerial discretion and can take advantage of treasury stocks. We also observed 
that after 1 October 2001, stock repurchases increased for firms with weak incentives 
to signal undervaluation but did not increase for those who had strong incentives. We 
call the effect of deregulation on those firms the ‘pump-priming effect’. 
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 surveys the motivations 
for stock repurchases. Section 3 develops the hypotheses. Section 4 describes sample, 
data and variables. Section 5 reports our results. Our conclusions are presented in 
section 6. 
 
2 The Motivation behind Stock Repurchases   
Previous studies documented five motivations for stock repurchases. First, Dann 
(1981), Vermaelen (1981), Comment and Jarrell (1991) and Dittmar (2000) suggest 
that managers who believe that their firms are undervalued by the market tend to 
repurchase outstanding shares as a way of signalling information. The announcement 
of stock repurchases is then followed by a stock price increase, which may correct the 
misvaluation. 
Second, Vermaelen (1984), Harris and Raviv (1988), Stulz (1988) and Bagwell 4 
 
(1992) look at how managers undertake stock repurchases to increase the acquisition 
price and to lower the threat of being acquired.  Stock repurchases can decrease 
floating stocks and increase stable shareholders’ holding. In this way, firms can 
increase the lowest price at which their shares may be available, and thus lower the 
risk of becoming takeover targets. 
Third,  according to the trade-off theory of capital structure,  firms  are likely  to 
mitigate deviation between actual and target leverage ratio in order to achieve their 
optimal leverage ratio. Bagwell and Shoven (1988), Opler and Titman (1996) and 
Dittmar (2000) show that firms with a leverage ratio below their target ratio retire a 
large number of shares by stock repurchases in order to increase their debt-to-equity 
ratio. 
Fourth, stock repurchases and dividends are two ways in which firms distribute 
excess cash to shareholders and decrease the agency costs resulting from excess cash 
flow. Kaplan and Reishus (1990) and Denis, Denis and Sarin (1994) suggest that, 
since the income tax rate is higher than the capital gains tax rate, management may 
prefer repurchase, which is taxed at the capital gains tax rate, over dividends, which 
are taxable at the income tax rate. 
Finally,  Dunsby (1994), Jolls (1998)  and Fenn and Liang (1997) examine how 
stock options encourage managers to substitute stock  repurchases for dividends, 
because repurchases decrease the shares outstanding, and, unlike dividends, do not 
dilute the per-share value of firms. 
 
3 Developing the Hypotheses   
Under the old regulation, Japanese firms were able to repurchase their own shares 
solely for the purposes of stock cancellation or employee stock option plans. Under 
the new regulation, as of 1 October 2001, repurchased stocks can be either retired or 
held as treasury stocks for later reissue. If they are cancelled, stock repurchases 
decrease outstanding shares permanently unless there is a new share issue. If they are 
not cancelled, treasury stocks can be reissued to specific shareholders, business 
partners or employees;  a move that strengthens a firm’s relationships with its 
stakeholders. They can also be reissued in order to raise funds when firms find they 
are overvalued by the market. 
We considered the influence of holding and reissuing treasury stocks on stock 
repurchases by firms that had several different motivations. Companies may acquire 
their own shares; this move will signal undervaluation if a company finds that its 
stocks are undervalued by the market and subject to a takeover threat. Firms can 
exchange treasury stocks with stable shareholders—its main bank, business partners 
and employee stock ownership plans—because the deregulation of stock repurchases 
give firms managerial discretion to do so. Stable holdings mitigate the threat of 
takeover. We assumed that stock repurchases on the notion of signalling and takeover 
deterrence increased after the ban on treasury stocks was lifted. 
The deregulation of stock repurchases also gives firms the ability to hold treasury 
stocks for subscription rights. Firms granting warrant bonds will decrease their future 
debt-to-equity  ratio and may adjust their capital structure through a repurchase 5 
 
program; this will maintain their optimal leverage. On the other hand, those firms 
with a leverage ratio that is below their target ratio can repurchase stock and then 
resell it when they find that their debt ratio is higher than expected. We assumed that 
stock repurchases for capital structure adjustment increase, since firms have 
managerial discretion. 
Since the deregulation of stock repurchases, firms can now hold treasury stocks 
until a later reissue. Agency problems will still exist, however, unless firms cancel 
their treasury stocks. Repurchasing is not an efficient way for firms to distribute 
excess cash to shareholders and reduce agency costs, as it once was. Keeping this in 
mind, we believe that stock repurchase for cash distribution would not increase after 
the ban on treasury stocks was lifted. This belief led to the following testable 
hypothesis: 
 
[H1] Once the ban on treasury stocks has been lifted, there is a corresponding 
increase in stock repurchases based on motivations that have some degree of 
managerial discretion. The greater that discretion is, the greater the number of stock 
repurchases.   
 
Since firms were strictly limited in their stock repurchase plans before 1 October 
2001, corporate managers would have initiated a repurchase plan only when they had 
a strong incentive to do so. This move would have signalled the firm’s strong future 
prospects and thus mitigated any takeover threat, deviation from optimal leverage or 
the distribution of excess cash to lower agency cost. Therefore, the deregulation of 
stock repurchases might have less attraction for those firms that already have a strong 
incentive to repurchase stock.  However, those firms with a weak incentive to 
repurchase stock might respond more positively to the regulatory reform, because 
they are free to repurchase and can use treasury stocks flexibly. Thus, we can assume 
that there is no significant difference between the two periods for companies that have 
a stronger incentive to repurchase—that is, the period before 1 October 2001, and 
afterward—while those firms that have a weaker incentive to repurchase stocks would 
increase their stock repurchases significantly during the period after deregulation. 
This brings us to our second hypothesis: 
 
[H2] Lifting the ban on treasury stocks promotes stock repurchases by firms that have 
a relatively weak motivation to repurchase their stock 
 
4 Construction of Sample, Data and Variables   
4.1 Sample and Data 
The sample begins with all open-market stock repurchase announcements by Japanese 
firms listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange. The stock repurchase sample spans a 
10-year period from fiscal year 1997 to fiscal year 2006. We excluded firms that had 
insufficient financial data or stock prices. Only Japanese firms that  are general 
businesses with a 12-month fiscal year-end are included in the sample. The screening 
process yields 2161 observations after a sampling distribution by 3σ rule. 6 
 
The data on stock repurchase announcements were  obtained from the  Nikkei 
Corporate Finance Database. We gather corporate annual financial data from Nikkei 
Corporate Financial Database. The data on stock prices were drawn from the Toyo 
Keizai Stock Price Data Bank. 
 
4.2 Construction of Variables   
4.2.1 Dependent Variable 
Two measures of stock repurchase are used in this paper. The first is the natural 
logarithm of the number of stock repurchases announced during a given year (ln 
number). The second is the number of announced repurchases to outstanding shares 
ratio (number of repurchases/shares)
[1]. 
 
4.2.2 Explanatory Variables 
There are four main explanatory variables that correspond to the potential motivations 
behind stock repurchases. The first variable is market-to-book ratio (M/B), which is 
defined as the market value of equity to the book value of equity at the end of the year 
prior to the repurchases. We used market-to-book ratio to measure market 
performance and takeover risk, since firms with a low market-to-book ratio are likely 
to repurchase shares as a signalling undervaluation to markets, and as a tool to avoid 
becoming takeover targets. 
The second variable is deviation, which represents the difference between firms’ 
actual and target leverage ratio. In light of the firms’ actual performance, we use the 
industry median leverage to predict the firms’ target leverage ratio, and deviation is 
then defined as actual leverage minus target leverage ratio estimated by industry 
median leverage
[2]. 
The third variable is free-cash flow (FCF), which is defined as operating income 
before depreciation minus interest expense, income taxes and dividends, scaled by 
book value of total assets.   
The fourth variable is payout ratio (payout), which is calculated as the ratio of cash 
dividends paid to net income in the year prior to the repurchase. Free-cash flow and 
payout ratio are included as proxies for dividend substitutions. 
 
4.2.3 Control Variables 
We follow previous studies’ conventions (Dittmar, 2000) and also include cash level, 
which is defined as the ratio of cash and equivalents to total assets. Stock option is 
designed as a dummy (stock option), which is equal to one if a firm grants stock 
options, and zero otherwise. 
According to Billett (2008), unlike larger firms, which can attract more attention 
from investors, small firms are likely to buy back more outstanding shares, in part to 
attract attention from the market. Size is thus included, and defined as the natural 
logarithm of sales. Pre-repurchase profitability is also measured by return on equity 
(ROE). 
 
4.3 Summary Statistics 7 
 
We examined differences in the mean and the median of announced repurchases 
between the two periods using other measures of stock repurchases—that is, the value 
of repurchase/market equity and the number of repurchases/shares. Table 2 shows our 
sample’s summary statistics.  Both the mean and the median of stock repurchases 
during the latter period are significantly larger than they were before (a 1% level), 
regardless of for repurchases. This is an expected outcome, since the deregulation of 
stock repurchases on 1 October 2001, gave firms the ability to take advantage of 
treasury stocks. 
Table 2: Difference in stock repurchases between the two periods   
Panel A    Mean 
    value of repurchases 
/market equity 
number of repurchases 
/outstanding shares     
Before October 1, 2001  0.030    0.025   
After October 1, 2001  0.050    0.040   
difference  0.019    0.014   
t-statistics  (5.107)***  (8.037)*** 
Panel B    Median 
    value of repurchases 
/market equity 
number of repurchases 
/shares outstanding     
Before October 1, 2001  0.020    0.018   
After October 1, 2001  0.031    0.027   
difference  0.011    0.010   
wilcoxon-test  (8.690)***  (8.524)*** 
Note: 
*,
 ** and 
*** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Table 3 illustrates our main variables and tests the difference in means between the 
two periods—before and after 1 October 2001. The M/B and the deviation after 1 
October  2001  have means of 1.361 and −0.036, respectively, which are not 
significantly higher than those in the former period (1.285 and −0.057, respectively). 
There is a significant increase in the FCF (from 1.626 to 2.633), and a significant 
decrease in the payout (from 0.859 to 0.394) when we compare the means of the two 
periods. The results suggest that firms have more excess cash and fewer cash 
dividends during the latter period, and firms with large financial margins tend to 
undertake stock repurchases instead of cash dividends. 
Table 3: Summary statistics 
    M/B  Deviation  FCF  Payout  Cash  Size  ROE  N 
Before 1 October 1 
 
1.285    −0.057    1.626    0.859    0.170    11.583    0.027    615   
After 1 October 2001  1.361    −0.036    2.633    0.394    0.147    11.680    0.049    1546   
difference  0.076    0.020    1.008    −0.464    −0.023    0.097    0.021    931   
t-statistics  (0.520)  (0.678)  (4.072)***  (−2.189)**  (−4.870)***  (1.433)  (4.207)***     
Notes: 
*,
 ** and 
*** indicates significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
N = the number of the observations. 
 
5 Empirical Results 
5.1 Univariate Analysis 8 
 
We investigated the impact of the deregulation of stock repurchases in Japan on 
corporate financial behaviours by looking at the motivations for repurchase. We 
created five portfolios based on our four explanatory variables, respectively, and 
computed the mean of ln number in each portfolio. We then reported the results of 
t-statistics for the differences among small, medium and large portfolios, and between 
the two periods—before and after 1 October 2001, as Table 4 shows. 
Panel A in Table 4 shows how firms increase stock repurchases significantly when 
they have relatively higher market-to-book ratios, while for those firms undervalued 
by the market, there is no significant difference between the two periods. We also 
found that, in both periods, firms repurchased more outstanding shares when they 
were undervalued, and repurchased fewer shares when they were overvalued. This 
suggests that signalling undervaluation might be a motivation for firms to acquire 
treasury stocks, whether before or after the deregulation of stock repurchases, and that 
regulatory reform motivated those firms with relatively high market-to-book ratio to 
increase their stock repurchases. 
Table 4: Univariate analysis 
Panel A             
    M/ B  difference 
    1(small)  2  3(middle)  4  5(large)  5-3  t-statistics  3-1  t-statistics  5-1  t-statistics 
Before  14.302    14.215    14.356    13.959    13.426    −0.930    (−4.217)***  0.053    (0.358)  −0.877    (−4.271)*** 
After  14.506    14.355    14.396    14.771    14.262    −0.134    (−1.023)  −0.110    (−0.967)  −0.244    (−1.915)* 
difference  0.204    0.139    0.040    0.812    0.837               
t-statistics  (1.608)  (1.019)  (0.270)  (4.088)***  (4.021)***             
Panel B 
    Deviation  difference 
    1(small)  2  3(middle)  4  5(large)  5-3  t-statistics  3-1  t-statistics  5-1  t-statistics 
Before  14.173    13.715    13.848    14.221    14.314    0.466    (2.352)**  −0.324    (−1.675)*  0.141    (0.860) 
After  14.565    14.302    14.291    14.510    14.681    0.390    (2.835)***  −0.274    (−2.169)**  0.116    (0.800) 
difference  0.393    0.587    0.443    0.288    0.367               
t-statistics  (2.717)***  (3.789)***  (2.459)**  (1.653)*  (2.056)**             
Panel C 
    FCF  difference 
    1(small)  2  3(middle)  4  5(large)  5-3  t-statistics  3-1  t-statistics  5-1  t-statistics 
Before  13.821    14.322    14.241    13.619    13.816    −0.426    (−1.736)*  0.420    (1.646)  −0.005    (−0.020) 
After  14.299    14.443    14.493    14.595    14.466    −0.027    (−0.239)  0.194    (1.643)  0.167    (1.416) 
difference  0.478    0.121    0.252    0.976    0.650               
t-statistics  (2.261)**  (0.832)  (1.321)  (5.055)  (3.378)***                         
Panel D 
    Payout  difference 
    1(small)  2  3(middle)  4  5(large)  5-3  t-statistics  3-1  t-statistics  5-1  t-statistics 
Before  14.046    13.424    14.009    14.310    14.341    0.331    (1.852)*  −0.037    (−0.178)  0.295    (1.773)* 
After  14.523    14.258    14.480    14.553    14.521    0.041    (0.344)  −0.043    (−0.341)  −0.001    (−0.011) 
difference  0.477    0.834    0.471    0.243    0.180               
t-statistics  (2.791)***  (3.907)***  (2.855)***  (1.627)  (1.296)             
 
Panel B illustrates how stock repurchases after 1 October 2001, increased 9 
 
significantly, regardless of the deviation from firms’ target leverage ratio. The 
differences between the two periods are greater and more significant when firms are 
underlevered (significant at 1%) than when they are overlevered (significant at 5%). 
The results also show a U-shaped relationship between stock repurchases and the 
deviation. It seems that the deregulation of stock repurchases encourages 
underlevered firms to acquire treasury stocks, by which they approximate optimal 
debt ratio to maximise firm value. For those firms with higher leverage ratios, 
deregulation also motivated them to repurchases their own shares through managerial 
discretion. 
The results shown in Panel C indicate that stock repurchases increased significantly 
after 1 October 2001, for both firms with very low free-cash flow and for those with 
the highest level of free cash. In both periods, we cannot find a positively linear 
relationship between stock repurchases and the FCF as Bagwell and Shoven (1989) 
and Grullon (1997) suggest. 
Panel D highlights how firms with relatively lower cash dividends in the year prior 
to the repurchase program increased stock repurchases significantly in the later period. 
We assume that these firms increased their repurchases rather than dividends in order 
to avoid a dividend cut in the future. The results do not support a negative relationship 
between stock repurchases and the payout in each period. 
 
5.2 Bivariate Analysis 
We also examined corporate reaction to the deregulation of stock repurchases and 
looked at the usage of treasury stocks using bivariate analysis. If we regard firms in 
the top two portfolios (the 4
th and the 5
th portfolios) in Table 4 as firms with large 
M/B (deviation, FCF, or payout) (see Table 5), and firms in the bottom two portfolios 
(the 1
st and the 2
nd portfolios) in Table 4 as those with small M/B (deviation, FCF or 
payout) (see Table 5), then one portfolio (the 3
rd portfolio) is out of bivariate analysis.   
Table 5 shows the mean ln number of each new portfolio and the t-statistics for the 
difference between the two periods.  Panel A illustrates how  firms with a higher 
market price and higher leverage ratios increased their stock repurchases significantly 
during the later period, whilst, for those firms with  strong incentives to signal 
undervaluation and adjust capital structure by repurchases, there is no significant 
difference between the two periods. This finding suggests that firms with weak 
incentives to signal undervaluation and adjust capital structure are likely to increase 
stock repurchases in response to the deregulation. 
The results in Panel B show that stock repurchases were significantly higher during 
the later period, when market-to-book ratio is relatively low and firms hold greater 
free cash. This finding suggests that after the ban on treasury stocks was lifted, firms 
with large agency costs tended to increase repurchases, in order to distribute excess 
cash. In Panel C, we see that firms with good market performance and relatively low 
cash dividend ratios tended to increase stock repurchase after 1 October 2001. Panel 
D shows that for firms with low leverage ratios and excess cash, stock repurchases 
increased after the ban on treasury stocks was lifted. In Panel E, we see a significant 
increase in repurchases, when firms have low debt ratios and low cash dividend ratios 10 
 
in the year prior to repurchases. Panel F illustrates how stock repurchases increased 
significantly when a firm had high free-cash flow and low cash dividend ratios. The 
results suggest that stock repurchase may be an increasingly important way for firms 
with relatively low debt ratios to distribute cash to shareholders and reduce agency 
costs, because corporate managers have discretion during the later period. 
Overall, the deregulation of stock repurchases motivates  repurchase programs 
announced by those firms with relatively high market-to-book ratios, more excess 
cash or fewer cash dividends. We did not find evidence that is consistent with the 
capital structure adjustment theory. It seems that capital structure adjustment might be 
a secondary motivation for stock repurchases. 
Table 5: Bivariate analysis 
Panel A 
        Deviation 
    small 
difference  t-statistics 
large 
difference  t-statistics 
        D1  D2  D1  D2 
M/B 
small  14.200    14.391    0.191    (1.526)                 
large                  13.726    14.586    0.860    (3.422)*** 
Panel B 
    M/B 
    small 
difference    t-statistics   
large 
difference  t-statistics 
        D1  D2  D1  D2 
FCF 
large  14.106    14.397    0.291    (1.709)*                 
small                  13.917    14.245    0.327    (1.507) 
Panel C 
    M/B 
    small 
difference  t-statistics   
large 
difference  t-statistics 
        D1  D2  D1  D2 
Payout 
small  14.278    14.499    0.221    (1.345)                 
large                  14.294    14.674    0.380    (1.662)* 
Panel D 
    Deviation 
    small 
difference  t-statistics   
large 
difference  t-statistics 
        D1  D2  D1  D2 
FCF 
large  13.586    14.525    0.939    (4.877)***                 
small                  14.453    14.590    0.137    (0.799) 
Panel E 
    Deviation 
    small 
difference  t-statistics 
large 
difference  t-statistics 
        D1  D2  D1  D2 
Payout 
small  13.522    14.292    0.771    (4.024)***                 
large                  14.500    14.610    0.110    (0.652) 
Panel F 
    Payout 
    small 
difference  t-statistics 
large 
difference  t-statistics 
        D1  D2  D1  D2 
FCF 
large  13.334    14.298    0.964    (4.014)***                 




 ** and 
***: significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
5.3 Regression analysis 
We followed the convention of stock repurchases studies and regressed a model in 
which stock repurchases announced by firm i in year t are dependent on a set of 
potential motivations: 
 
To further understand the change in stock repurchases that resulted from lifting the 
ban  on treasury stocks, we developed the above model, which gave us a new 
regression, as follows. Xn  represents a set of potential motivations for stock 
repurchases. D is a dummy, which is equal to one when a repurchase was announced 
after the deregulation on 1 October 2001, and zero otherwise
[3]. 
 
We employed two measures of stock repurchases. The first is the natural logarithm of 
the number of repurchases (ln number). The second measure is the number of 
repurchases to outstanding shares ratio (number of repurchases/shares). 
In Table 6, we can see that Adj. R
2 decreases by 15% when we change our measure 
of stock repurchases from ln number to number of repurchases/share (0.220 vs. 0.069). 
Correspondingly, F-value decreased by 28, from 39 to 11. Panel A in Table 6 shows 
that the relationship between stock repurchases and market performance is negative 
with the coefficient of −0.272, significant at a 1% level, on average, while in the 
period after the deregulation, there is a significantly positive effect on this relationship. 
We can see that the coefficient of M/B becomes −0.021 during the later period. This 
suggests that the deregulation of treasury stocks attracts firms with relatively high 
market-to-book ratio to increase their stock repurchases, since firms have managerial 
discretion and are able to take advantages of treasury stocks to reach their expected 
goals, such as mergers and acquisitions or a stock option plan. 
Our results do not support the theory that stock repurchases are used for capital 
structure adjustment by Japanese firms. We find that the relationship between stock 
repurchases and the deviation did not change after 1 October 2001
[4].
 Instead, we saw 
that stock repurchases are positively and significantly related to excess cash and do 
not change a great deal during the later period, which suggests that Japanese firms 
undertook stock repurchases in order to distribute excess cash to shareholders and 
reduce agency costs, and that deregulation did not provide an incentive for firms to 
increase their stock repurchases. We believe this is the case because, during the later 
period, firms are not subject to the regulations and can hold treasury stocks for as long 12 
 
as they want, they can also reissue treasury stocks and still have agency problems. It 
seems that stock repurchases may not be an efficient way to lower agency costs after 
the ban on treasury stocks was lifted. The results shown in Panel A do not support the 
notion that stock repurchases are significantly related to cash dividends in the year 
prior to repurchasing, whether before or after the deregulation. 
There are several similarities between Panel B and Panel A. The relationship 
between stock repurchases and M/B is negative and significant during the period from 
1997 to 2006, and there is a significantly positive effect on this relationship after 1 
October 2001, when the slope becomes gentler. Stock repurchases are positively and 
significantly related to free-cash flow, on average, and do not increase during the later 
period. There is no significant relationship between stock repurchases and cash 
dividends. We also found that stock repurchase is positively  but not significantly 
related to deviation from target leverage. 
Table 6: Regression of stock repurchases 
Panel A    Dependent variable: ln number 
            D 
    coefficient  (t-statistics)  coefficient  (t-statistics) 
(Constant)  9.759    (17.888)***     
M/B  −0.272    (−6.262)***  0.251    (5.630)*** 
Deviation  −0.093    (−1.022)  −0.094    (−0.840) 
FCF  0.026    (1.948)*  −0.009    (−0.619) 
Payout  0.002    (0.231)  0.014    (0.430) 
Cash  −0.607    (−1.023)  −0.983    (−1.396) 
Stock option  −0.445    (−3.727)***  −0.187    (−0.299) 
Size  0.435    (9.776)***  0.042    (0.816) 
ROE  −2.041    (−2.143)**  1.398    (1.401) 
Adi. R2  0.220   
F-statistics  39.032 
N  2161 
Panel B    Dependent variable: number of repurchases/shares 
              D 
    coefficient  (t-statistics)  coefficient  (t-statistics) 
(Constant)  0.065    (4.445)***     
M/B  −0.004    (−3.109)***  0.003    (2.540)** 
Deviation  0.000    (0.060)  0.003    (0.857) 
FCF  0.001    (2.000)*  −0.001    (−1.406) 
Payout  0.000    (0.387)  0.000    (−0.197) 
Cash  0.013    (0.841)  −0.002    (−0.097) 
Stock option  −0.002    (−0.670)  0.032    (1.884)* 
Size  −0.003    (−2.698)***  −0.002    (−1.251) 
ROE  −0.005    (−0.202)  0.040    (1.499) 
Adi. R2  0.069   
F-statistics  10.968 
N  2161 
Notes: Estimated t-statistics appear in parentheses after the coefficient estimates. N = the number of observations. 
*,
 ** and 
*** indicates 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Since we use both free-cash flow and dividend payouts as proxies for dividend 
substitutions, we then, to find stronger evidence about the effect of the deregulation 
on agency problems, split our sample into four sub-samples by controlling for FCF 
and payout simultaneously.  A portion of our testing model’s estimates for each 
sub-sample is shown in Table 7; it includes only the coefficients of FCF and payout. 
Table 7: Regression of stock repurchases on agency interpretation 
Panel A    Dependent variable: ln number 
            D 
  coefficient  (t-statistics)  coefficient  (t-statistics) 
total sample 
FCF  0.026    (1.948)*  −0.009    (−0.619) 
Payout  0.002    (0.231)  0.014    (0.430) 
subsample: small FCF & small Payout 
FCF  0.009    (0.180)  −0.004    (−0.061) 
Payout  −0.094    (−0.776)  −0.166    (−0.649) 
subsample: small FCF & large Payout 
FCF  0.101    (1.159)  −0.086    (−0.932) 
Payout  0.020    (1.454)  0.120    (1.574) 
subsample: large FCF & small Payout 
FCF  0.091    (2.578)**  −0.071    (−1.748)* 
Payout  −0.644    (−1.349)  0.629    (1.279) 
subsample: large FCF & large Payout 
FCF  0.023    (0.411)  −0.043    (−0.707) 
Payout  −0.006    (−0.811)  −0.004    (−0.079) 
Panel B    Dependent variable: number of repurchase/shares outstanding 
            D 
  coefficient  (t-statistics)  coefficient  (t-statistics) 
total sample 
FCF  0.001    (2.000)*  −0.001    (−1.406) 
Payout  0.000    (0.387)  0.000    (−0.197) 
subsample: small FCF & small Payout 
FCF  0.000    (−0.193)  0.000    (−0.177) 
Payout  0.001    (0.260)  0.000    (0.067) 
subsample: small FCF & large Payout 
FCF  0.000    (0.162)  −0.001    (−0.397) 
Payout  0.001    (1.543)  0.002    (1.149) 
subsample: large FCF & small Payout 
FCF  0.003    (3.944)***  −0.001    (−1.542) 
Payout  0.002    (0.20)  −0.001    (−0.055) 
subsample: large FCF & large Payout 
FCF  0.001    (0.746)  0.000    (−0.177) 
Payout  0.000    (−0.441)  0.000    (−0.097) 
Notes: Estimated t-statistics appear in parentheses after the coefficient estimates. 
*,
 ** and 
*** indicates significance at the 10%, 5% 
and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
With respect to the four sub-samples, the results from Table 7 show that only for 
firms with large excess cash and fewer cash dividends are stock repurchases 14 
 
positively and significantly related to free-cash flow. This finding suggests that firms 
with free-cash flow problems tend to lower agency costs by stock repurchases over 
the sample period. For those firms, the deregulation of stock repurchases had a 
significantly negative effect on the relationship between repurchase programs and 
free-cash flow. Hence, the coefficient of FCF becomes 0.020 after the deregulation, 
when we measure repurchase announcements by number. The results also show that 
firms with a great deal of excess cash and fewer cash dividends did not change their 
behaviour after the deregulation of stock repurchases, when the dependent variable is 
the number of repurchase/shares. In other words, the deregulation of stock 
repurchases prompted only a small portion of firms with free-cash flow problems to 
increase stock repurchases. These results thus verify our hypotheses. 
 
6 Conclusion 
The deregulation of stock repurchases in Japan that began on 1 October 2001, gave 
firms the ability to take advantage of treasury stocks to help them meet specific goals. 
This study focused on that regulatory reform and examined in detail the effect of the 
deregulation on corporate financial behaviours. We found that stock repurchases 
increased significantly after the ban on treasury stocks was lifted. Repurchases 
became an increasingly important financial strategy in Japan because of their inherent 
flexibility. We focused on the firms that increased stock repurchases to respond to the 
new reform by looking at the motivations for repurchasing, and confirming the 
pump-priming effect of the deregulation of stock repurchases. 
  Our results show that Japanese firms undertook stock repurchases in order to signal 
undervaluation or to distribute excess cash to shareholders, whether before or after the 
ban on treasury stocks was lifted. We did not find that Japanese firms initiated a 
repurchase program to adjust capital structure. Firms with a large amount of excess 
cash and fewer cash dividends tended to undertake stock repurchases in order to 
reduce agency costs over the sample period. The deregulation of stock repurchases did 
not motivate repurchase programs by firms that had incentives to mitigate agency 
problems, since firms could hold treasury stocks and agency problems still existed 
unless cancellation of treasury stocks. Although firms repurchased stock when they 
had excess cash, stock repurchases were used to complement cash dividends, rather 
than as a substitute for them. We determined that, after the deregulation of stock 
repurchases, there was a significant increase in repurchases announced by firms with 
weak incentives to signal undervaluation  or deter hostile takeover, rather than by 
firms with strong incentives to do so, since firms are free to acquire their own shares 
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[1] We also used the natural logarithm of the value of announced repurchases and the 
value of repurchases divided  by market capitalisation as measures of dependent 
variable. We focused on number volume of stock repurchases only, not the estimates 
of value of stock repurchases, in order to avoid biasing the results, since the value of 
stock repurchases is naturally positively related to market prices, all things being 
equal. 
 
[2] We used two methods to predict firms’ target leverage ratio. First, as Hovakimian, 
Opler and Titman (2007) do, we modelled a similar regression in order to predict 
firms’ targets. Second, considering firms’ potential preference, we also used industry 
median leverage as another measure of predicted leverage ratio. The results suggest 
that firms do not use a complicated regression model to estimate their target leverage 
ratio, because this model makes it more difficult for firms to benchmark themselves to 
industry counterparts, and because industry median leverage may be a more reliable 
estimator than the regression model. 
 
[3] In order to robust test, we classified our observations by controlling the repurchase 
announcement day: this gave us two sub-samples. The first sub-sample includes stock 
repurchases announced before the ban on treasury stocks was lifted. The other 
sub-sample includes stock repurchases announced after 1 October 2001. Our robust 
check is based on the basic model presented in Section 5. Ln number and number of 
repurchases/shares are used to measure stock repurchases. The results are similar to 
those shown in Table 6. 
 
[4]  From univariate analysis, we observed a U-shaped relationship between stock 
repurchases and deviation from the target leverage. We therefore regressed a model in 
which we included Deviation^2 as one of explanatory variables. We observed one 
difference from the results shown in Table 6: the coefficient of Deviation^2 is positive 
(with the coefficient of 0.017) and significant at the 5% level when we measure stock 
repurchases by number. 